Technological advances have outpaced the development of laws and norms to govern their acquisition and use. Software piracy is an instance of unauthorized duplication where laws and norms are not agreed upon. Although many articles have been written around the issue of software piracy, few have taken into consideration social and psychological aspects of the process. One barometer of the social environment is media coverage. This paper presents a content analysis (including actual quotes) of the five highest circulating U.S. newspapers 1989-2004 as evidence of the prevailing social environment surrounding software piracy. We classified the rationales for and against piracy using Fiske's (1991) structures for social interaction and found that those who condone piracy mostly evoke authority ranking and market pricing models, whereas those who condemn piracy mostly evoke market pricing models. Furthermore, not all the rationales given for/ against software piracy fit neatly into Sykes and Matza (1957) neutralization framework.
Introduction
The development of technologies has outpaced the development of laws and norms that regulate their acquisition and use. The unauthorized duplication of digital products is an instance of this problem. Digital products are information that "can be digitizedencoded as a stream of bits" (Shapiro and Varian 1999, p.3) . Digital products are compact, portable, and can be used virtually anywhere. However, the unauthorized duplication of digital products has created a gray area in the ethical landscape, where some condone the practice as legitimate while others condemn the practice as outright theft. Software, as an instance of a digital product exemplifies this situation well.
Software piracy is defined as any reproduction of software that is in violation of its licensing agreement. The very term expresses a moral position, that espoused by the software industry. According to this view, piracy is stealing, it is a crime, and it is unethical. This is also the position expressed by the movie industry in ads against downloading films, another digital product. As ads on some currently sold DVDs state in subsequent frames and graphically: "You wouldn't steal a car/ handbag/ television/ DVD." The ads follow sequentially with "Downloading pirated films is stealing…Stealing is against the law…Piracy is a crime." In opposition are those who question the immorality of software piracy, as well as its illegality. The question even arises as to whether software piracy is rightfully considered a moral issue at all.
The research reflects this moral ambiguity as well. Advocates of digital property rights like the Business Software Alliance (BSA) claim that "under the U.S. Copyright Law, anyone who reproduces a software program in violation of a license agreement is guilty of committing infringement [a.k.a. piracy]" (Majors 2005) . Advocates of digital property rights maintain that digital piracy costs billions of dollars in revenues, wages, jobs, and taxes for the U.S.A. alone ( Serafini 2001; AutoDesk 2002; Plagiarism.org; Business Software Alliance 2004) . Evidence like this has led some researchers to construe piracy as a problem (Vitell and Davis 1990) and has led to proposed technical solutions to remedy its occurrences (Herzberg and Pinter 1987; Potlapally 2002; Naumovich and Memon 2003) . This normative approach is also grounded in the legal argument that it is unacceptable to copy software without authorization because it violates the rights of the software creator who does not sell ownership of the software but merely licenses its use.
On the other side of the issue, some literature has questioned the economic impacts of software piracy by arguing it can be beneficial for a producer to allow piracy for users who have a low willingness to pay (Takeyama 1994; Slive and Bernhardt 1998; Harbaugh and Khemka 2001; Jiang and Sarkar 2003.) . People who do not pay (in monetary terms) for software benefit the software producer by increasing the total number of users, thereby encouraging potential users (because of compatibility issues) to legally purchase the software product. Copying materials may also be acceptable because the consequences of the action have benefits in terms of knowledge sharing and societal advancement (Swinyard, Rinne and Kau 1990; Thong and Yap 1998) . Unlike stealing of material goods, private individuals and law enforcement show a relatively high tolerance for software piracy 1 . The practice is also prevalent among certain subgroups.
For example, according to Solomon and O'Brien (1991) , piracy is blessed with high acceptance among at least some students and, e.g. : "nearly half of the students had never heard a faculty member speak against illegal copying…a quarter of the sampled students had heard a faculty member condone the copying of protected software" (p. 174). The moral ambiguity of software piracy is further highlighted by the research of Strikwerda and Ross (1992) , Logsdon, Thompson and Reid (1994) , and Glass and Wood (1996) who have shown that piracy is not viewed as an ethical issue by some. Individuals may approach duplication as a preference choice, with no principles, norms, or values being brought to bear on the decision (Glass and Wood 1996) .
Because there are no agreed upon standards or norms to govern the acquisition and use of software, individuals are left to their own decision-making processes which vary significantly. To decide the issue of software duplication, an individual might consult the legal system (Laczniak 1983) , review academic findings, or look for input from public opinion on the subject (Blasi 1980 ).
The first potential guide for ethical behavior is the legal perspective. However, the legal perspective is ambiguous in this area: "While the law in most countries is confusing and out of date…the legal position in the United States, for example, has been confused further by the widely varying judgments handed down by U.S. courts" (Forester and Morrison 1994, p. 7) . The following excerpt of a law review details a few of the legal ambiguities. (Horovitz 1985, p. 130-144) .
In the absence of a clear, unified legal guideline (Burk 2004) , an individual might look to academic findings on the subject. One approach taken in academic studies of piracy has been to implicitly adopt the corporate view: focusing on modeling the piracy behavior (Takeyama 1994; Slive and Bernhardt 1998) , exploring individual differences (Doesn't Everybody do it? 2001), and proposing technical solutions to reduce the behavior (Herzberg and Pinter 1987; Potlapally 2002; Naumovich and Memon 2003) including the development of pricing strategies that minimize piracy's effect (Sundararajan 2003) .
Other research has been open to other perspectives, e.g., studying the disparity in copyright enforcement between groups and individuals (Harbaugh and Khemka 2001) , and the possibility that piracy may be beneficial to software manufacturers (Conner and Rumelt 1991; Jiang and Sarkar 2003) . Thus, the moral ambiguity of software manifests itself in both the legal arena and the academic literature.
Before discussing the third prospective guide to ethical behavior, we also note that academic literature uncovers a need for a general understanding of the social and 
Literature and Research Questions
The theoretical background in this section draws on literature from ethical decisionmaking, social construction, and neutralization. Zamoon and Curley (2005) provide a more complete descriptive theory of the ethical decision-making processes involving technology. This section highlights the key points of that account as it relates to the current study.
Software piracy involves individuals making ethical decisions. Ethical decision-making "involves moral justification of the decision" (Miner and Petocz 2003, p. 12) 2 . Research focused on ethical decision-making has highlighted three key points. First, ethical decision-making relies on applying principled reasoning to the question situation.
Second, ethical decision-making carries consequences for others than the decision maker (i.e. there is a social aspect). Third, ethical decision-making will not be activated unless an individual recognizes the moral component of the situation. The theoretical bases in this section are organized around these three features of ethical decision-making.
Applying Principled Reasoning
The first distinguishing feature of ethical decision-making is the use of principled reasoning. In an ethical decision-making process, an individual brings forth norms and principles to assess the degree of right or wrong as a guide to action. "Right" and "wrong" are social constructs that are heavily bound to locale and time (Berger and Luckmann 1967) . In the case of software duplication these social constructions are illdefined in the present time. It is not clear how individuals are making decisions, or what principles are being brought to bear on the situation. This leads to our general research question.
General Research Question: What are the rationales cited for and against software piracy?
This research question motivates the methodology applied in the study. We perform a content analysis of newspaper articles that argue for and/ or against unauthorized duplication of software. The newspaper rationales are understood to mirror the prevailing views on software piracy (their use is further explicated in Section 3). As such, the reported reasons stated for and against software piracy provide a useful aid for understanding social attitudes surrounding this issue of ambiguous moral standing. To provide a more precise and theoretically grounded analysis of these rationales, two theories are applied. These arise from the two other features of ethical decision-making and are introduced in the next two sections.
Realizing Social Component(s)
The second distinguishing feature of ethical decision-making is its social component.
Ethical decision-making carries consequences for other than the decision maker (Rest, Bebeau, and Volker 1986 1967; Kunz and Jaehne 1983) . Indeed, ethics (or morality) itself is a social construction, because "morality is not constructed in the mind of any one individual-as individual cognitive operation-but negotiated among individuals, deliberated, and arrived at through agreement" (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma 1999, p. 301 ).
Social problems are "what people think they are" (Fuller and Myers 1941, p. 321) . They are socially constructed (Schneider 1985) , and they emerge as a collective definition of the problem is built and legitimized through social influence (Schoenfeld, Meier, and Griffin 1979; Schneider 1985) . As the product of a social construction, rationales for and against software piracy arise from the social worldview that is applied to their construction. This observation motivates the application of Fiske's (1991) Fiske also maintains that models of social interaction are arranged along a continuum.
Bases for the order along the continuum are the tradeoffs between the degree of flexibility (precision of coordination) versus "the differential costs of collecting and storing information necessary to use each model, the differential costs of making the calculations necessary to use each model" (Haslam 2004, p. 23) . The model with the most flexibility and least tracking of information/ calculations is CS followed by AR and EM each having increasingly less flexibility and requiring more mental involvement. The model of least flexibility (i.e. having most precision) and requiring most information and mental accounting is MP.
As this paper strives to describe the complete phenomenon of software piracy (as presented by American popular press), it is necessary to compare rationales from both positions on the issue to answer the following research question.
Research Question (1): Are proponents on both sides of the piracy issue arguing their position using similar types of arguments with respect to Fiske's (1991) models?
The answer to this question can reveal if people are arguing the same point. For example if the focus of the difference is from a single market pricing position, then solutions focusing on the economic factor can be pursued. If, however, there is a disconnect where one side is arguing from (say) a market pricing standpoint and the other position deals with communal sharing perspective, then more research may be required in order to bring all interested parties into the same area for collaboration.
Relying on Fiske's interpretation of interaction models, we make the following predictions. On the one hand, we expect those who condone piracy to have mostly communal sharing rationales in an effort to achieve the most flexibility. On the other hand, we expect those who condemn piracy to strive for more control and hence have more market pricing rationales. We expect those who condone piracy to rely on CS because community members may feel a duty to help other members of their group due to feelings of cooperation and generosity. Reasons for condoning piracy should decrease along Fiske's continuum as individuals who condone piracy are more likely to value flexibility most and be least concerned with keeping track of usage. Those who condemn piracy are expected to view unauthorized duplication as an unfair system of exchange which violated proportional equality (i.e. they are not being paid fairly for their work).
The trend along Fiske's continuum is expected to be increasing as those who condemn piracy are interested in retaining control over their products and preserving their rights (i.e. knowing who has or has not paid for using the product).
Recognizing a Moral Issue
The third feature of ethical decision-making is recognition of a moral issue. For an individual to apply principled reasoning to a decision situation, an individual must activate ethical decision-making processes. Moral intensity of an issue, which is "the extent of issue-related moral imperative" (Jones 1991, p. 372) , is one way of classifying situational features that impact whether the individual invokes ethical principles in the decision-making process. Even though the moral intensity of a situation may push an individual to activate ethical decision-making schema, neutralization techniques may counter that force. Neutralization techniques are arguments or rationalizations used to explain circumstances for the temporary removal of an otherwise accepted norm, and/ or qualify its suspension to legitimize one's actions in order to rebut accusations of wrongdoing (Sykes and Matza 1957) .
Whether considered as part of the decision process or as a post-rationalization, neutralization techniques serve to reduce the moral intensity of the situation. This theory thus provides a tool for analyzing both pro and con rationales as reflecting the accepted moral intensity. Sykes and Matza organized neutralization techniques into a framework of 5 types: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalty. In denial of responsibility the perpetrator exploits society's distinction between intentional and unintentional outcomes, where being forced to do something by other people or circumstances can reduce culpability.
Example statements may include "I didn't mean it." In denial of injury the perpetrator proclaims that no harm is done, so no consequences should be exacted. Example statements may include "I didn't really hurt anybody." In denial of victim the perpetrator describes the negative action as a due punishment. Example statements may include "They had it coming to them." In condemnation of condemners the perpetrator shifts focus from the negative act to the behaviors and motives of those who disapprove.
Example statements may include "Everybody is picking on me." In appeal to higher loyalty the perpetrator maintains the negative action was in compliance with another norm that outweighs the violated one. Example statements may include "I didn't do it for myself."
In 2005 Compared to other applications of neutralization theory, software piracy is a problem with three unique characteristics that provide additional interest to their potential application in this context. First, norms surrounding software acquirement and use are not obvious/ strong/ rigid, and full monitoring of software duplication is not possible at this time. These circumstances, according to Robinson and Kraatz (1998) , contribute to the ability to neutralize. Second, software duplication usually occurs at a distance from the owner's site. According to Sama and Shoaf (2002) , when decision-makers are removed "psychically and physically from the very stakeholders their decisions impact," the perceived harm can be minimized (p. 94).
The third feature is particularly important for the application of neutralization theory in our methodology: Software piracy does not carry a stigmatizing criminal concept.
Established social problems whose values have been codified into law carry consequences not only in the possible fines and incarcerations they exact, but in creating a stigmatizing criminal concept (Minor 1981) . Software piracy differs from other types of value violations where neutralization theory has been applied because of its moral ambiguity. The original framework was developed around delinquent acts in the physical world at a time when technology was not as pervasive in daily interactions, and for situations where clear norms existed to judge the appropriateness of an action. As such, the second research question investigates the application of Sykes and Matza's neutralization framework to this new area.
Research Question (2a): Do piracy rationales fit into Sykes and Matza's (1957) framework?
Here we specifically expect to find techniques of denial of injury and condemnation of the condemners heavily used by those who condone piracy. Since software can exist in two (or more) places at once, there is no obvious depravation when an unauthorized copy is made. The fact that there is no apparent loss in value (as opposed to taking a physical object that cannot exist in two places at once) explains the denial of injury expectation.
Condemnation of the condemner is expected because of the prevailing culture of the Internet, where everyone is perceived as engaging in the culture of "sharing" via making unauthorized copies of digital materials.
For those who condemn piracy we expect a counter neutralization of expectation of injury to emerge. We believe that those who condemn piracy will argue that pirates commit unauthorized duplication knowing that producers will lose money. We also expect representation in the reduction to self interest counter neutralization, because those who condemn piracy will not be convinced by the appeal to higher loyalty arguments. It is not only important to recount instances of neutralization and counter neutralization, but to compare the discourse using that framework. This leads to our final research question for this paper.
Research Question (2b): Are proponents on both sides of the piracy issue arguing their position from similar neutralization techniques?
We expect neutralization and counter neutralization techniques to be slightly mismatched around the public discourse surrounding piracy. We believe that those who condone piracy will favor denial of injury and condemnation of the condemners, whereas those who condemn piracy will favor expectation of injury and reduction to self interest.
Methodology
Ethical decision-making relies on applying norms that are socially constructed and agreed upon. As such, the very social nature of ethical decision-making points to the viability of using media coverage as a data source, where problems garner for attention and legitimization. Printed media are selected for their prevalence, their availability, and their previous use in such analysis. As Adelman and Verbrugge (2000) explain "Newspapers are an accessible, non-transient form of media. They are inexpensive, have broad public use and can be read and reread" (347). News media not only construct the problem and build the needed support (Blumer 1971; Schoenfeld, Meier, and Griffin 1979; Schneider 1985 , Yankelovich 1991 , but also politicians and social advocates "use their newsmaking power to channel the coverage to social problems into a definite direction" (from Molotch and Lester 1974 cited in Fishman 1978, p. 541) . Because the purpose of this paper is to describe the social construction of piracy emphasizing its underpinnings at the societal level, it is natural to analyze how newspapers present such a topic 3 .
Precedence for this type of newspaper analysis is found in many fields, including management, political science, healthcare, and criminology. In a study of organizational failure, an analysis of newspaper and scholastic articles was used to support interviews (Northrup 1990 
Data Sources and Collection Procedures
The "newspaper that is not read ceases to be an influence in the community. The power of the press may be roughly measured by the number of people who read it" (Park 1923, p. 274 Having decided the publications to include and the timeframe of study, we identified the search term of "software piracy" to be entered as an autonomous search item into both Lexis Nexis and ProQuest. We were careful to select only articles with full text within our timeframe. According to the automated search of publications, the first appearance of the term "software piracy" in the popular press was in the Washington Post on May 16, 1983. We have considered this article the public's first exposure to the piracy issue. As Year Adelman and Verbrugge (2000) contended that media reports (concerning disease)
followed an emergence, maturation, decline, and death lifecycle. Emergence represented when a disease is first defined; maturation represented when a disease was taken for granted; and death / decline represented when the epidemiological rates (as well as newspaper coverage) fell unless there was resurgence. Looking at the aggregated figures of piracy coverage in our selected coverage window (Figure 1 ), it appears that the late 1980s and early 1990 were the emergence period for piracy coverage in newspapers. In 1990s the topic of piracy matures with the number of overall citations peaking in 1995.
Review of the analysis pool of articles revealed: 86 instances where piracy was not a focus of the article (irrelevant mention), 93 articles that gave no rationales, and 20 retrievals that were not articles but summary or index pages. The rightmost column of Table 1 shows the number of articles included in content analysis by publication. The final dataset consisted of 193 articles for coding. 
Data Coding
We coded both rationales for piracy and rationales against piracy. Categorizing procedures included parsing the text and assigning it to categories of meaning, which were then tied to theoretical underpinnings and emergent themes. As such, before constructing categories we read approximately 25% of the newspaper articles (with representation from each publication) to get a sense of relevant themes. This provided a stability check for saturation of the categories. We constructed parsimonious categories that reflected the research purpose /questions, were based on the data, were independent, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that connected to theoretical underpinnings (see Appendix A for ties of the constructed categories to existing literature). We also incorporated a catch-all category at the end of both sets of rationales in case there were elements of the articles that related to social perceptions of piracy that were deemed significant though not within the constructed categories.
The coding goals and approach was based upon several methodological approaches to content analysis (Cohen 1960; Holsti 1969; Hill, Thompson and Williams 1997; Marshall and Rossman 1999) , from which we developed the following four step categorizing procedure:
1) We separated utterance or sentence segments in the newspaper article for coding.
2) We identified rationales for and against piracy using cue words to parse newspaper sentences 9 . In parsing the text, we looked for reasons the author, interviewee, or any entity gave for justifying decisions to or not to duplicate software (either explicit mention of key words, or implicitly inferred from surrounding subject).
3) We used three levels of analysis in applying the coding (Appendix A). For each level counts of articles were calculated. At the top level was the overall number of articles that cited one or more rationales for piracy, and the number of articles that cited rationales against piracy. At the intermediate level were frequencies of rationales that fit into the two digit categories. At the lowest level, we used the three digit subcategories to count frequencies of occurrences. For example, an article may cite making $20 from each copy of software, that it is "cool" to be able to crack piracy prevention mechanisms, that pirates compete to see who has the best cracking skills, and that a pirate becomes "king" among peers after cracking a difficult protection mechanism. The following explains how such a passage was coded for its pro-piracy rationales. 
Reliability Analysis Procedures
Reliability is confirmed through the use of external judges who categorize the data. It is a function of the clarity of categories and categorization instructions, as well as the degree of ambiguity in the wording of the article itself. The extent of agreement between coders was computed by Cohen's (1960) with the researcher, where disagreements were resolved by negotiation. The initial reliability ratings were less than optimal (having a coefficient of reliability at 17.04%).
The reformulation of categorization instructions and selection of a new judge (Judge B)
led to a coefficient of reliability of 67.5% and Cohen's Kappa of 33.23% in the first round. After meeting with Judge B and discussing cases of categorization disagreement, the coefficient of reliability increased to 89.52% and Cohen's Kappa to 78.63%, both well within acceptable range.
Intra-rater reliability coefficient is the code-recode agreement of the researcher over a random sample of articles (Miles and Huber 1984) . The researcher recoded 20 articles (over 10% of the analysis pool, having representation from all publications) 6 weeks after initial coding. Intra-coder reliability was approximately 91% using Cohen's Kappa, and over 95% using Holsti's coefficient of reliability.
Results
Of the 193 articles coded, 122 gave rationales for piracy. These rationales were an accumulation of statements from pirates, prosecutors, and even commentaries on piracy issues. The single leading reason for condoning piracy was reducing monetary expenditures, which accounted for over 17% of the cited rationales. Of the 193 articles coded 156 gave rationales against piracy. The leading reason given, capturing over 53% of the citations was the economic hardships that piracy leaves on software producers. In the remainder of this section we present our findings ordered by research question.
Research Question (1): Are proponents on both sides of the piracy issue
arguing their position using similar types of arguments with respect to
Fiske's (1991) social interaction models?
In order to assess how different groups condone or condemn piracy, we compare their arguments using Fiske's relational models. Generally, rationales against piracy better fir In Communal Sharing those who argued for the unauthorized duplication of software supported their claims using a plethora of reasons, whereas those who argued against the unauthorized duplication heavily relied on one type of rationale to support their argument. Authority Ranking and Equity Matching models were more evenly represented on both sides of the issue. Market Pricing, however, was more often used by those who condemn unauthorized duplication.
Although we expected those who condone piracy to have mostly Communal Sharing rationales, Authority Ranking and Market Pricing rationales were more prevalent. Our expectation that those who condemn piracy would favor Market Pricing rationales is confirmed. Surprisingly, there are neither descending trends along Fiske's continuum for those who condone piracy nor ascending trends on the continuum for those who condemn piracy.
Now that we have reviewed our general findings on the types of rationales used to defend decisions not/ to duplicate software without authorization, we investigate how these rationales match up on both sides of the issue.
Communal Sharing
People who argue for the unauthorized duplication of software may invoke Communal
Sharing. According to Fiske's (1991) interpretation the claim here is: since there is a need and we are a community, the need must be filled. There is a strong sense of a compassionate caring morality and wanting to belong.
People operating using this model of social interaction can claim they are sharing software in order to benefit one or more people who are currently underprivileged, but who the actor has no specific connection with. A type of Robin Hood rationale emerges where (for example):
" 'The argument we hear from the pirates is that they are helping the Polish population make contact with the cultures of the world,' … an argument can be made that homegrown pirates of Western culture were key actors in the collapse of communism …" (Washington Post, Oct 21, 1991) A different type of sharing attitude can occur when the duplicator has a connection with the recipient of the software, and values that relationship stating "A person's feelings of closeness to a friend take priority over some abstract ethical principle," (New York Times, Jul 27, 1992) Another example of sharing is where the actor claims that sharing actually helps the producer:
"Basically, if it wasn't for us, you would never see this piece of software" (New York Times, Jul 11, 2002) People who argue that unauthorized duplication is wrong employ CS by sharing items that were created with that philosophy in mind. For example:
"adoption of open-source software will significantly aid in reducing the amount of software piracy" (New York Times, Dec 31, 2001)
Authority Ranking
The driving force here (according to Fiske 1991) is the need to obey, where it is the responsibility of persons in authority to uphold order so as to protect others. Since there is no enforcement of rules, individuals who condone piracy feel justified in duplicating software without authorization.
"Because it lacks any central authority, the Internet is particularly difficult for law-enforcement agencies to monitor for piracy. Some software publishers have taking to calling it the 'home shoplifting network' " (New York Times, Jan 8, 1996) " 'Look, if we [IRC administrators] find one channel and close it, they move to another,' he said. 'It's been like this for years. You really can't stop it.' " (New York Times, May 6, 2004) An extreme case of this type of reasoning involves challenging the legitimacy of the law (proposed hierarchy) itself.
"publishers provide no legal way for gamers to get older games; the market is too small to justify the effort. So gamers feel justified in making vintage games available [through piracy], despite legal risks" (New York Times, May 18, 2000) Those who condemn piracy feel a need/ responsibility to enforce the rules in two main ways. 1) By pursuing pirates:
"Beyond relying on an automated Web crawler that scours the Internet for unauthorized files, alliance investigators also try to snare pirates by gradually building relationships with them, using assumed identities" (New York Times, Jan 19, 2004);
2) By upholding the legitimacy of the rules:
"copyright infringement is illegal" (Los Angeles Times Jul 26, 1998) "Many of the pirates say they were motivated less by money than by a sense of competition, prestige … form of bravado that could gain them acceptance in a hierarchical social sphere… 'It's all about stature' … 'They are just trying to make a name for themselves for no reason other than self-gratification' … secure their reputations by releasing thousands of free movies, games, music and software programs on the Internet … Warez involve frenzied competition … Couriers are ranked in groups and as individuals with a scoring system " (New York Times, Jul 11, 2002)
Equity Matching
The overarching need here is for justice and balance to prevail in interactions (Fiske 1991 2) There is no loss in value (no harm done), so unauthorized duplication is permissible.
"There's no way on earth I would shell out $60 for LucasArts' 'TIE FIGHTER' game, but if I could get it for free, sure I'd try give it a try. Since I never would have bought it in the first place, my 'pirated' copy of 'TIE FIGHTER' would actually represent a net loss to LucasArts of $0" (Los Angeles Times, Nov 17, 1994) 3) There is no way to distinguish those who are unjust from those that are just, so unauthorized duplication is permissible.
"'It's very easy to be anonymous on the Internet because there are so many points of entry,' Mr. Fancher said. Although each transaction into and out of a bulletin board is recorded by the system, he said: 'even if you trace it back, it's not like a phone number. You can't determine the user's identity because all you can know is the point of entry' " (New York Times, Apr 9, 1994) 4) Since everyone is participating in the injustice, it is permissible. On the other hand, some see piracy as an unequal treatment or distribution of benefits where some do not pay for products they use. By not paying, it is not a fair deal. It's not fair to the software producer because non-paying consumers are denying payment in the present as well as detracting from future products. It is not fair to non-paying consumers because they are not getting a fully working product.
"copying software and selling it or giving it to somebody else amounts to stealing. … 'It is outright theft' " ( 
Market Pricing
The focus of MP is agreement upon proportional contribution. Those who condone piracy claim that not having enough money to pay for the product, or the product's unnecessarily high price excuses the action.
"problem stems from lack of government funds appropriated specifically to buy legal software … It is unrealistic for government agencies to invest large amounts to buy legal software" (Los Angeles Times, Jul 12, 1995) To those who disagree with piracy, getting a pirated product is not a bargain, it is theft.
1) It costs money to produce software.
"cost U.S. hardware and software companies nearly $3 billion in lost wages, tax revenues and retail sales last year" (LA Times, Jul 24, 1999) 2) Piracy influences an entire industry.
"The widespread piracy doesn't just hurt big companies such as Microsoft; China's own fledgling software industry can't grow if companies' efforts are stolen and distributed by pirates … lost market share on the mainland " (Wall Street Journal, Oct 27, 1995) 3) Piracy amounts to a loss of assets.
"There is a growing recognition {in the government} of the importance of intellectual property to our economy and general way of life" (LA Times, Jul 24, 1999) Other A group of rationales condoning piracy did not fit into Fiske's social interaction models.
Among other elements were deflecting responsibility, non-complicated nature of the process, and location where the act of duplication was committed. Another group of rationales cited against piracy did not fit into Fiske's models of social interaction. This group included acknowledgment that unauthorized duplication is immoral, and that the action of piracy can have links to organized crime and even national security implications for sensitive application software.
Research Question (2a): Do piracy rationales fit into Sykes and Matza's (1957) framework?
We expected to find techniques of denial of injury and condemnation of the condemners heavily used by those who condone piracy. While condemnation of the condemners is confirmed to have the most representation, denial of injury was surprisingly low (lower than both appeal to higher loyalty and denial of responsibility even!). For those who condemn piracy we expected counter neutralizations of expectation of injury and reduction to self interest to emerge. Expectation of injury and equality of condemnation had the most representation, while reduction to self interest had relatively low representation.
Denial of Responsibility Vs. Acceptance of Accountability
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"We're a rapidly growing company so the control is probably not what it should have been" (Los Angeles Times, Nov 15, 1996) "their salespeople were tricked into giving away the unlicensed software" (Los Angeles Times, Oct 31, 1995)
"It was essentially an oversight by the data processing personnel who were not at all paying attention to the duplication of software" (New York Times, Jul 16, 1997)
Counter Neutralizations
Those who disagree with software piracy point out that there are alternatives to unauthorized duplication. For example:
Denial of Injury Vs. Expectation of Injury
Neutralizations
Because more blame is assigned to people whose action result in more severe outcomes than those with lower consequences (Daley and Zane 1982), some articles highlighted the fact that software piracy caused no real damage. That is, the individual wouldn't have bought the program (regardless of the cost), and software producers make plenty of money. Some articles even acknowledged that piracy may be considered inappropriate, but contended there was no profit from the activity. Such articles seemed to suggest that since there was no monetary gain for them, the act was not/ should not be considered offensive.
For example:
"Software liberationists contend that the crime is victimless" (New York Times, Dec 16, 2001) "claimed [hacking] was an effort to point out security flaws" (Washington Post, Jul 31, 1995) "defended 'ware zing' expensive software as a way to try it out before purchasing a legitimate copy" (New York Times, Dec 16, 2001)
Counter Neutralizations
Those who condemn acts of software piracy maintain that unauthorized duplication is harmful to manufacturers and copyright holders in two ways.
1) In terms of lost revenues. For example:
"piracy costs the software industry $13 billion a year worldwide in lost revenue." (Washington Post, Aug 29, 2003) 2) In terms of software industry growth (or lack thereof). For example: 
Denial of Victim Vs. Fairness of System
This was the least frequent of the neutralization techniques. We might theorize that the reason denial of victim has such a low representation is the fact that people don't perceive there to be anyone impacted by their unauthorized copying.
Neutralizations
Neutralization techniques for this type focused upon taking revenge against a villain. For example:
"freeing software is a blow against an Evil Empire whose Darth Vader is Bill Gates" (New York Times, Dec 16, 2001)
Counter Neutralizations
Theoretically, this category should capture utterances that portrayed the current system of copyright and licensing of software as fair. However, no rationales were coded in this category (i.e. the issue of piracy is not argued from this position).
Condemnation of the Condemners Vs. Equality of Condemnation
Neutralizations
The fact the software piracy is described as being common was evident in our content
analysis. This could be construed in a manner similar to the condemnation of condemners' neutralization technique. If everyone is acting in an offensive manner, why are only certain individuals being questioned about/ punished for their actions. In that sense it is understood that the reasons for singling one person out are suspect.
Some blamed judicial processes for the proliferation of unauthorized duplication. For example:
"if downloading has become more popular … that's because 'the courts move slower than the criminals' " (USA Today, May 14 , 2002) "There is also the challenge for law-enforcement agencies of having to interpret copyright and counterfeiting laws written before the arrival of a high-speed communications network. 'None of our laws were written with the Internet in mind' " (NYT, Jan 8, 1996) "federal law is murky on how to treat people who copy and distribute software for free" (WP, Dec 30, 1994) Others blamed inconsistencies of anti-piracy laws. For example:
"the company's e-book decryption software was legal is Russia" (New York Times, Dec 18, 2002)
"Italian laws permits copying for personal use and says that applies to corporations." (Wall Street Journal, Dec 13, 1990) "China has no copyright law of its own and has refused to join the International Copyright Convention. Victims of Chinese piracy thus virtually powerless to stop attacks, and they find little solace in Chinese courts." (Washington Post, Jan 14, 1989) Still others portrayed unauthorized duplication as a standard behavior.
"Everybody else is doing it" (USA Today, Oct 15, 2002)
Counter Neutralizations
For those who disagree with piracy, condemnation of pirates is justified because piracy laws are equally applied to all, and not everybody pirates software. Examples of equal condemnation include:
"[Software Publisher's Association] will pursue and audit companies that don't pay for the software they use" (New York Times, Jul 6, 1998) Furthermore, those who condemn piracy see the act as both illegal and immoral.
"Just as it's wrong to walk into blockbuster video, take a movie off the shelf and stick it in your pocket, it is also a crime to download a pirated copy of a movie" ( "A pirate program in China is often referred to as 'patriotic software,' out of a belief that it speeds the nation's modernization at little or no cost." (Aug 23, 1995) "copied programs to share with friends" (Washington Post, Dec 30, 1994 "elite file-sharing networks typically limit access to savvy hackers who must prove their stripes by contributing hard-to-get material" (USA Today, Aug 26, 2004) 
For those who believe piracy is wrong, the alternative to the appeal to higher loyalty is that the action is based on self interest. People are worse off because of the action, and the higher loyalty is not recognized/ justified. According to those who condemn piracy, pirates create a multitude of problems. For example:
"Pirated programs are more likely to have viruses and flaws than legal software" (New York Times, Aug 24, 1995) "much of the fake software is bug-ridden" (USA Based on Figure 3 , we note the mismatch in frequencies of neutralization and counter neutralization types of arguments in the public discourse surrounding software piracy. In fact appeal to higher loyalty vs. reduction to self interest and denial of victim vs. fairness of system are the closest in terms of equal arguments frequencies. Arguments surrounding denial of injury vs. expectation of injury are least matched.
Conclusions
Ethical decisions have been distinguished from other decisions on the bases of the use of principled justifications and of the social nature of ethical decisions. The first of these features leads to the need to examine the arguments used to condone piracy. The second feature leads to grounding the analysis in theories of social construction. The focus of this work was on understanding how piracy is perceived by the public. We deliberately selected piracy as the focus of our study due to its ambiguous moral nature.
Summary of Findings
An analysis of mainstream newspaper articles dealing with software piracy was performed as an indicator of how people within American society think and feel about this subject. Some clear results emerge from our analysis. One of which is the degree of variety surrounding rationales given for/ against software piracy. We recounted instances of rationales for and against the unauthorized duplication of software. We classified the rationales for and against piracy using Fiske's (1991) structures for social interaction and found that those who condone piracy mostly evoke authority ranking and market pricing models, whereas those who condemn piracy mostly evoke market pricing. The mismatch between the types of rationales points to a disjoint in the public conversation surrounding the issue of software piracy. With respect to Sykes and Matza's theory of neutralization, it is also clear that not all the rationales given for/ against software piracy fit neatly into Sykes and Matza (1957) framework. Specifically the denial of victim is not addressed.
Furthermore, there is a mismatch between neutralizations and counter neutralizations.
One of the most interesting findings of this paper has to do with a belief maintained by those who condone piracy that they are not only "not hurting anybody" but that they are in fact "doing good or helping." Ashforth and Anand (2003) can help us to understand this stance explaining that "ideologies help distance individuals and groups from the 
Limitations
Here, we describe decisions made about how we conducted the research and the issues that resulted. In selecting newspaper articles as the target of our investigation, we note that the media's role is not merely to report what goes on, but to determine which topics are published and to provide spin that can impact people's thought processes. Previous academic works have stated that newspapers "not wholly a rational product" (Park 1923, p. 273) , and that "Journalists simultaneously create and perpetuate an image of reality when they assemble news products" (Stallings 1990, p. 87) . It is also important to state that newspapers reflect [not only the world out there but] practices of those whom have power (Schudson 1989) . As such, a publication supported by (for example) Microsoft will have an interest in presenting a particular view point of the software piracy issue.
Aside from news production, individuals bring their own set of experiences when trying to construct meaning from newspaper articles, where the "relative importance of media discourse depends on how readily available meaning-generating experiences are in people's everyday lives" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, p. 9) . With the pervasiveness of software piracy, we assume that readers of newspaper articles are already familiar with unauthorized duplication of software as a concept. In that sense, there is a role for the reader of the article such that "people are not 'cultural dopes,' passively reading tests as the producers intended" (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson 1992, p. 388) .
In selecting content analysis as an investigation tool, we run the risk of span of inferential reasoning (Marshall and Rossman 1999) . Here, coders can delve deeply into each sentence searching for possible effects of piracy and thinking of the issue from multiple perspectives. We have controlled for inferential reasoning by targeting the literal surface meaning of the text for coding.
Contributions
This paper comprises potential contributions for academics and practitioners alike. For academics the paper represents an empirical link between ethical decision-making and neutralization theory. Previous research has shown that neutralization techniques are offense specific (Sykes and Matza 1957; Mitchell and Dodder 1980; Mitchell and Dodder 1983; Agnew 1994; McCarthy and Stewart 1998; Copes 2003) . Techniques of neutralization have, for the most part, been applied to serious and violent offences (e.g. Brennan 1974; Minor 1980; Agnew 1994; Alvarez 1997 ) and the research has been biased towards incarcerated or convicted persons. Neutralization theory has not previously been applied to software piracy, and "reasons why such illegal behavior continues to occur are lacking" (Harrington 2000, p. 83 business hours) (Lim 2002) ; related is the examination of Neumann and Simpson (1997) about bootlegging music. This took a different approach by searching for closeness to an artist, development of music, and capture of time (infatuation and fetish were also addressed).
Furthermore, conflicting results in previous neutralization research can be attributed to:
over-reliance on quantitative techniques, where the "dynamic cognitive nature of neutralization suggest that qualitative methods are well suited to test the theory" (Copes 2003, p. 106) . As there are no previous studies of software piracy and Sykes and Matza's techniques of neutralization 11 there is no baseline for comparison, hence our qualitative research yields a more complete picture of software piracy. As such, our content analysis of newspaper articles detailing piracy occurrences is an application of an existing method in a new technology-enabled area. In addition, our paper provides actual excerpts of the rationales. In studying the rationales given for piracy researchers can develop and test counter arguments to the justifications for committing piracy, which may help individuals begin to evoke ethical decision making processes and principles when approaching the subject. We believe this paper will help understand tolerance for piracy, and advance understanding for how moral universes are constructed for goods and services that do not fit traditional descriptions.
Practitioner contributions include implications for management and law. For example, understanding and challenging 12 piracy neutralizations may reduce their acceptance, thereby evolving norms and laws to govern digital technologies; or, based on the neutralizations invoked by users, technology-producing industries may revise pricing structures, protection mechanisms, or create new products.
Extensions and Directions for Future Research
Using the current data set and noting that there isn't consistent media coverage for the issue of software piracy, we could use the Department of Justice's copyright enforcement 11 Harrington's (2000) study used only "Robin Hood" and "responsibility denial" techniques. 12 Gorta 1998 records as a secondary confirmatory resource against which to validate the chronological trend analysis 13 . Another viable extension would be to plot newspaper articles against stages of the social problem 14 . Alternatively, since it is the awareness of key individuals that makes an otherwise unnoticed situation become defined as a problem (Fuller and Myers 1941), we might address how mass media can spotlight both the people and norms surrounding software piracy. We could also compare media messages across all 5 news sources. As Husted, Dozier, McMahon, and Kattan 1996 argued that cross-national carriers of ethics (such as news media, business education, and travel experience) could alter attitudes about questionable business practices, another use of this data might be to examine how US produced media messages about software piracy are viewed crossnationally.
Independent of the current data set, researchers might conduct a content analysis of blogs or other online sources to see if the rationales presented there differ from what we have found in traditional media (Protess, Leff, Brooks, and Gordon 1985) . This will particularly be interesting given that,
In the e-commerce revolution, millions of dollars are being tossed about.
Rules have yet to be written, and those that have aren't always enforced.
No wonder the instances of unethical, even criminal behavior are growing exponentially (Seglin, 2000) .
In general media research has been shown to impact public opinion (Page, Shapiro, Dempsey 1987; Jordan and Page 1992) . Specifically research has confirmed that newspaper coverage can affect policy preferences (Jordan 1993) . Hence, another possibility for extending this work includes researching ties of copyright prosecutions and media agenda setting for policies and how those impact public opinion. A final direction for expanding this body of work is to study the rationales given for piracy in order to determine the degree of acceptance of such rationales. 13 Technique adapted from Adelman and Verbrugge (2000) . 14 Technique from Schoenfeld, Meier, and Griffin (1979) .
Appendices
Rationales AGAINST copying/ duplicating 2. Perpetrator is challenged on the basis of his/ her choice and the existence of alternatives.
Free ware/ Open source software
Denial of Injury
Example and Explanation:
I didn't really hurt anybody.
Perpetrator proclaims that no harm is done, so no consequences should be exacted.
1.2.3
No depravation 1.5.1 Advertising/ Promoting 1.8.2 Sharing w/ future purchasing
Expectation of Injury
Example and Explanation:
You hurt somebody.
Perpetrator is challenged on the logical expectation of injury.
Monetary terms
Foster industry growth
Denial of Victim
They had it coming to them.
Perpetrator describes the negative action as a due punishment.
Revenge
Fairness of System
Law, not vigilantism, is fair.
Perpetrator is challenged on the basis of the appropriateness of the existing system.
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Condemnation of the Condemners
Example and Explanation:
Everybody is picking on me.
Perpetrator shifts focus from the negative act to the behaviors and motives of those who disapprove. 
Equality of Condemnation
Example and Explanation:
Everybody is equally picked on.
Perpetrator is challenged based upon equal application of the system. 
